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I.

INTRODUCTION

Hemophilia results from the absence or insufficiency of coagulating
proteins, called "Factor VIII" and "Factor IX," in the hemophiliac's
blood supply. 1 The insufficiency of these proteins creates a risk of spontaneous and trauma-induced bleeding into joints, muscles or body cavities.2 Hemophiliacs are treated by infusions of a blood solid
concentrate, obtained from many donors, called antihemophilic factor
concentrate ("AHF').3 AHF contains the clotting factors, Factor VIII
and Factor IX. Contamination of the manufactured blood occurs if any
1. Leon W. Hoyer, M.D., Hemophilia A, 330 NEw
2. See id. at 38-41.

ENG. J. MED.

38 (1994).

3. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 413-14, (N.D. 11. 1994),
mandamus granted, rescinded, class certification denied, 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), and cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
4. See id.
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of the donors are infected with the HIV virus. 5 To prevent transmission
of AIDS through the blood supply, manufacturers must treat contaminated blood with heat to kill the virus.6

Failure of blood manufacturers to test and treat the blood supply
during the early 1980s left the plight of the hemophiliacs in the hands of
fate. As history demonstrated, fate was not kind to many hemophiliacs.
In July of 1982, doctors diagnosed three cases of opportunistic infections in hemophiliacs. 7 During that same year, a Center for Disease
Control (CDC) investigation report identified a number of unusual cases
of AIDS, all having the common characteristic of receiving blood transfusions or using a blood-based product during the previous five years.8
By January 1983, reports identified several cases of AIDS among
hemophiliacs. 9 At this time, the CDC presented evidence to blood suppliers that surrogate testing would reduce the transmission of AIDS
through blood. 10 Surrogate testing is a process that identifies characteristics in blood that typically accompany the AIDS virus." Because such
testing both increases costs of production and reduces the available
blood supply, blood suppliers were hesitant to implement such procedures.' 2 In the spring of 1993, Stanford University Blood Bank instituted surrogate testing, but the blood banking industry did not
immediately follow this example. 13 Finally, on March 2, 1985, the FDA
first licensed the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) test that
made screening blood for AIDS antibodies possible.' 4
In spite of strong evidence that AIDS is transmitted by blood transfusions, the blood banking industry responded slowly to the possibility
of HIV transmission through blood.' 5 A U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) study concluded that this delayed response led
to many additional HIV infections in hemophiliacs. 6 Although studies
5. See id. at 414.
6. Kenard E. Nelson, M.D. et al., Blood and Plasma Donations Among a Cohort of
Intravenous Drug Users, 263 JAMA 2194, 2197 (1990). But note, even with this treatment, cases
of transmission have been reported. Id. at 2197.
7. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ. Medical Ctr., 663 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1987).
8. Andrea Rock, Inside the Billion-DollarBusiness of Blood, MONEY, Mar. 1986, at 153.
9. Kathryn G. Lotfi, Suppliers of AIDS-Contaminated Blood Now Face Liability, 34 How.
L.J. 183, 187 (1991).
10. Id. at 187-88. See also Lehman, Blood Suppliers' Liability for AIDS Contaminated
Blood, 41 HEALTH LAW 107, 115 n.48 (1989).
11. See id.
12. Lotfi, supra note 9, at 188.
13. See id. at 189; Rock, supra note 8, at 167.
14. Lotfi, supra note 9, at 189.
15. See id.
16. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HIV AND THE BLOOD SUPPLY, July 13, 1995, summarized in,
AIDS Lino. REP., at 14027 (July 28, 1995).
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revealed significant evidence indicating that HIV was blood-borne,
blood safety policies changed very little during these early stages.1 7 An
estimated 10,000 persons with hemophilia-more than half the hemophiliac population-are currently infected with the HIV virus.18 By
1993, approximately 2,000 persons with hemophilia died from AIDS.19
Both the victims and the public at large were justified in wondering why
the blood industry moved with such "tragic slowness" in response to the
AIDS crisis.

20

In Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., a group of hemophiliacs

who contracted HIV through contaminated blood products, their
spouses, guardians, and personal representatives, brought an action
against four blood manufacturers and the National Hemophilia Foundation.21 Acting on behalf of persons with hemophilia in the United States
who became infected with the HIV virus due to their use of contaminated blood products, plaintiffs sought class certification of the suit
under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter Rule
231.22

The plaintiffs seeking class certification alleged that the defendant
manufacturers were negligent in failing to take precautions to prevent or
reduce viral contamination of their products after learning, in the 1970s,
that viruses causing diseases such as hepatitis were transmitted through
blood. 23 The plaintiffs further alleged that the blood manufacturers
failed to screen their products and failed to warn the hemophilia community of the danger of contracting AIDS through use of their products. 4
According to the plaintiffs, the defendant blood manufacturers should
have known both that the HIV virus was blood borne and that the virus
could be transmitted through their products.25 In addition, plaintiffs
presented claims of products liability, breach of implied warranty, and
conspiracy against the blood manufacturers, and further charged the
National Hemophilia Foundation with negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.26 The plaintiff class sought both compensatory and punitive
17. See id.
18. Symposium, HIV Infection Among Women of Reproductive Age, Children and
Adolescents: To Insure or Not to Insure Persons Infected with the Virus that Causes Aids, 77
IOWA L. REv. 1617 (1992).
19. See id.
20. See Rock, supra note 8, at 154.
21. 157 F.R.D. at 410.
22. Id. at 413.
23. Id. at 414.
24. Id. at 413.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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damages from all defendants.27
At the district court level, Judge Grady granted partial certification
to the nationwide class of plaintiffs after finding that the class met the
requirements of Rule 23(a). 28 He refrained from certifying the entire
controversy, under Rule 23(b), finding instead that individual questions
of fact dominated the issues of proximate cause, strict liability, breach of
implied warranty, and punitive damages. 29 Despite defendant opposition, Judge Grady granted certification on both the negligence and
breach of fiduciary duty claims under Rule 23(c)(4)(A). 30 Although
Judge Grady recognized that the fifty-one different jurisdictions
throughout the United States employ two different standards of care in
determining the issue of negligence, 31 he found that the parties could
address both standards of care. 32 Judge Grady viewed a class determination of negligence as the superior method "for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy" because it avoided the cumulative
presentation of evidence in separate trials.33
The defendants responded by seeking a writ of mandamus from the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that would require Judge Grady
to decertify the class.34 Since a certification order is not a final decision
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the defendants could not have
simply appealed at this time.35 The Supreme Court has identified two
requirements for obtaining a writ of mandamus. 36 First, the defendants
must suffer irreparable harm from the certification order.37 Second, they
must suffer a violation of a clear and indisputable right or suffer from an
abuse of judicial discretion by the district judge.38
In In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.,39 the Seventh Circuit found that
the defendants satisfied these two requirements. 4' As a result, the Seventh Circuit issued a writ decertifying the nationwide plaintiff class of
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 415-18.
Id. at 422-27.
Id. at 422-26.

31. Judge Grady identified the two standards of care as the standard of ordinary care and the

standard of professional care. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 425.

34. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
35. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Gardner v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480-82 (1978).
36. Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).
37. Id.
38. Id. See also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacarnas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988).
39. 51 F.3d at 1293.
40. Id. at 1295.
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hemophiliacs. 4 In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit found that because
the challenged order would evade effective review, the defendants
would suffer irreparable harm from class certification. 2 Additionally,
the court found that Judge Grady's certification plan exceeded the
bounds of permissible judicial discretion in three ways.43 First, the court
identified problems in determining the future of defendants' companies
in a single jury trial, where the feasible alternative of determining liability through a process of multiple trials existed." Additionally, the court
found that the plan violated the rule espoused in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins
[hereinafter Erie], by proposing to try the class action under a standard
of care consolidated from the fifty-one different jurisdictions throughout
the country. 46 Finally, the Seventh Circuit found that the plan created
Seventh Amendment problems by allowing one jury to determine liabil47
ity and then allowing another jury to determine proximate cause.
As a result of these concerns, the Seventh Circuit ordered decertification of the nationwide class of hemophiliacs.4" Judge Rovner dissented on the grounds that the majority used its writ of mandamus
powers to circumvent the rule that certification orders are not immediately appealable. 4 9 In addition, Judge Rovner disagreed with the majority's argument that Judge Grady's certification plan would prompt
settlement.50
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit denied the hemophiliac class'
request for an en banc rehearing, 1 and the Supreme Court, without com52
ment, denied the hemophiliac class' petition for certiorari.
In this Note, I shall analyze Judge Posner's majority opinion for the
Seventh Circuit in Rhone-Poulenc. Part I outlines the origin and evolution of class action lawsuits as a means of dispute resolution. Part II
criticizes Judge Posner's premise that individual trials are superior to a
class action for the resolution of this controversy. Part III considers
41. Id. at 1304.
42. Id. at 1297-98.

43. Id. at 1299.
44. Id. at 1300.

45. 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
46. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300.
47. Id. at 1304. According to Judge Posner in his majority opinion, this practice would
violate the Seventh Amendment principle that the findings of one jury cannot be reexamined by
another, subsequent jury. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1305.

51. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 9693 (7th Cir. Apr. 27, 1995) (en
banc).
52. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F. 3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184

(1995).
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whether the Erie doctrine allows a nationwide determination of liability.
Finally, Part IV concludes that Judge Grady's plan is in accord with the
Seventh Amendment.
II. HISTORY
The history of the class action suit has evolved through three
stages. In the first stage, the original drafters of Rule 23 believed that
class certification should be given a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation, and urged the courts to err in favor of certification rather than
against it.s 3 Under this view, the Federal Rules of Civil54 Procedure
would encourage just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions.
The second stage emerged as a reaction to numerous certifications
of class action suits in mass torts.55 Many courts adopted the belief that
such litigation was judicially unmanageable.56 In addition, scholars
called for a more restrictive interpretation of Rule 23 in order to protect
individual interests from submersion in large scale proceedings by providing every individual his or her day in court.57 The Advisory Committee encouraged such a restricted use of the class action, stating that
mass injury cases were inappropriate for class action treatment due to
the great likelihood that individual questions of damages and defenses to
liability would arise.5 8 In the years following, more courts refused to
certify class actions in the mass tort context,5 9 creating the appearance
that the class action would no longer be used as a device for resolving
mass litigation.
With the appearance of the mass tort dilemma created by the asbestos litigation, however, courts and scholars returned to a more liberal
application of the class action.6" First, due to the volume of litigation
flowing from mass disasters, courts began to rethink the policy against
class certification in such contexts. 61 For example, in Jenkins v.
Raymark Industries Inc.,62 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee's note (1966).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
55. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: CivI.

2D

§ 1754, at 52-54; In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 709, 728-32 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959

(1989).
56. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.

L. REv. 1343, 1344-46 (1995).
57. See id. at 1344.
58. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), advisory committee's note (1966).
59. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
60. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852
(1986).
61. Coffee, supra note 56, at 1345-46.
62. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, reh'g denied, en banc, 785 F.2d 1034 (5th
Cir. 1986).
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upholding class certification in an asbestos suit, recognized the need to
in order to
invent new methods to deal with the influx of mass tort cases
63
preserve judicial efficiency and prevent repetitive trials.
Second, by utilizing their Rule 23(c)(4)(A) authority to limit certification of a class to particular issues, courts were able to employ the class
action as a dispute settlement device in more cases. In support of limited certification, the Advisory Committee Official Comment to Rule
23(c)(4)(A) recognized "that an action could be maintained as a class
action as to particular issues only."' Additionally, between 1977 and
1993, the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth circuits all certified class
actions with respect to common issues of liability, but not as to the case
as a whole.65
Lastly, the class action has gained popularity as a result of its usefulness as a settlement encouraging device. Support for using the class
action in this way first appeared in In re Agent OrangeProduct Liability
Litigation.66 In that case, the Eastern District of New York applauded
the idea that a class determination of the causation issue could enhance
the possibility of settlement. 67 Although it still remains unclear whether
Rule 23 allows class certification for settlement purposes, a number of
courts and commentators believe that it does. 68 Further, in In re A.H.
Robins Co.,69 the Fourth Circuit concluded that Rule 23 allows the court
to certify a class with respect to a particular issue when it proves "superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy."70 Thus, when certification of a class increases the possibility for a group settlement, Rule 23 authorizes certification.
The underlying policy goals of both substantive tort law and civil
procedure contributed to the underlying use of class certification under
63. Id. at 473.
64. FE . R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A), advisory committee's note (1966).
65. In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995); In re A.H. Robins
Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus.. 782
F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
66. 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
67. Id. at 721.
68. "In recent years, several federal judges have explicitly recognized the effect of class
certification on the likelihood of prejudgment settlement in mass-tort suits, and have apparently
allowed such recognition to influence their decision to certify class actions." Bruce H. Nielson,
Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More
Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 461, 480 (1988).
69. 880 F.2d at 709.
70. Id.at 738 (quoting Roger H. Transgrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70
CoaRNL.L L. Rv. 779, 835 (1985)).
71. See id.
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Rule 23. Tort law seeks a fair and efficient resolution, attempts to compensate the victim of the wrong, and seeks to punish and deter the
wrongdoer from future misbehavior. 72 Similarly, the rules of civil pro73
cedure are driven by the policy goals of efficiency and fairness.
During the third stage, many judges, faced with a docket flooded
with individual tort claims and the possibility of repetitive trials, began
to emphasize the efficiency concerns of tort law and civil procedure.74
In addition, the class action suit protected fairness concerns of tort law
by ensuring resolution of the controversy and compensation to an individual litigant within a reasonable time period.75
In summary, a movement toward a more liberal application of Rule
23 in the mass tort context emerged with the asbestos and breast implant
litigation in an attempt to foster judicial efficiency. During this time,
many courts ignored the Advisory Committee's warning that class certification is inappropriate in the mass tort context.76 In addition, many
decisions began reflecting judicial acceptance of class treatment for separate issues. Finally, many courts and commentators recognized the
class action as a settlement fostering device.
Despite the number of cases employing a liberal application of the
class action since the influx of mass tort actions began in the late 1980s,
this trend may end. The more successful judges become at dealing with
mass torts, the larger the mass tort filings become.77 This steady filing
of mass tort claims creates new dissatisfaction with the class action
suit.78 Moreover, this increase in the volume of litigation decreases the
efficiency of the legal system, thereby undermining the very goals that
many judges set out to accomplish. 79 Individuals may become dissatisfied with the class action system because of this increase in the volume
of such suits. The inability to guarantee that the class certification controversy will be resolved within a reasonable time period, undermines
the fairness to individual class members achieved in earlier stages of the
class action.8 0 This new emphasis on the fairness concerns of defend72. Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Tortsfor Judges, 73 T"x. L. REv. 1821 (1995)
[hereinafter Mass Torts for Judges); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.15
(4th ed. 1992).
73. Mass Torts for Judges, supra note 72, at 1821.
74. See id. at 1822.
75. See id.
76. A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 734.
77. David Rosenberg, Comment, Issues in Civil Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue a
Symposium: Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master,
69 B.U. L. REv. 695, 711 (1989).
78. See id.
79. See id. See also Coffee, supra note 56, at 1344-46.
80. Rosenberg, supra note 77, at 711-12.
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ants, as illustrated in Judge Posner's decision in Rhone-Poulenc, may
dictate a more restrictive application of the class action law suit. This
would bring us into a fourth stage in the evolution of a class action law
suit. However, as this Note will argue, such an evolution should not
occur.
III.

ANALYSIS

Individual Trials Are Not the Superior Method for Resolving the
Hemophilia ContaminatedBlood Controversy

A.

In In re Rhone-Poulenc RorerInc.,81 Judge Posner argues that individual trials are the best method for the resolution of the hemophiliac
blood supply controversy.82 This section discusses the assumptions
Judge Posner uses to arrive at his conclusion and argues that these
assumptions are flawed.
To obtain a writ of mandamus, the challenged order must inflict
irreparable harm on the challenger, such that the possibility of effective
judicial review at the close of the case is precluded.8 3 Due to the magnitude of risk of bankruptcy that this class action places on the defendants,
84
Judge Posner argues that they will face intense pressure to settle.
However, Posner estimates that such pressure is economically unfair
because the defendants had already won twelve of the first thirteen law
suits brought against them. 85 These victories, according to Posner, predicted how the defendant would fare in future litigation. 6 Estimating
that without class certification defendants faced approximately 300 law
suits and approximately 125 million dollars worth of damage payments
in individual suits, and arguing that class certification would increase
this potential liability to about 25 billion dollars, Judge Posner concluded that certification of the class would force the defendants to setof review, it also
tle. 8 7 Because settlement eliminates the possibility
88
relief.
judicial
of
possibility
the
eliminates
In his opinion, Judge Posner formulates the premise that the
defendants' first twelve victories in thirteen cases were a representative
sample of the defendants' overall liability [hereinafter "Representative
Sample Premise"]. He uses this premise to conclude that Judge Grady
abused his discretion in certifying a class for the determination of liabil81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1299-1300.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1297.
Id. at 1298.

86. Id.
87. Id.

88. See id.
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ity.89 Judge Posner further reasoned that because twelve juries failed to
hold the defendants liable, the risk that a single jury in this class action
could find the defendants liable is too great to allow certification, when
individual trials were both a feasible and a superior alternative.9 ° Argu-

ing that a determination of liability by one jury in a class action could
bankrupt the blood banking industry, Judge Posner concluded that "it
... [would

not be] a waste of judicial resources to conduct more than

one trial.... to determine whether a major segment of the international
pharmaceutical industry ...

w[ould] follow the asbestos manufacturers

into Chapter 11."9'
1.

JUDGE POSNER'S PREMISE THAT THE DEFENDANTS' FIRST TWELVE
VICTORIES IN THIRTEEN TRIALS WAS A REPRESENTATIVE
SAMPLE OF DEFENDANTS'

LIABILITY MAY

PROVE INCORRECT

The merit of these arguments depends on the validity of Judge Posner's premise that defendants' first twelve victories are a representative
sample of the defendants' overall liability. First, if this sample is unrepresentative, then settlement would be chosen, not forced. If the defendants were in fact negligent, then they would probably welcome a
settlement. Consequently, defendants would fail to establish that they
suffered irreparable harm in order to satisfy their burden under the first
requirement for a writ of mandamus. Additionally, if this sample is not
representative, it does not necessarily follow that multiple individual trials are the superior method for resolving the issue of liability.
In formulating his Representative Sample Premise, Judge Posner
assumes a continuation of victories by defendants in future individual
trials.92 However, the cyclical theory of mass torts illustrates that this
assumption may be false.93 Under this theory of mass torts, a mass tort
passes through different stages until reaching maturation. 94 Different
95
stages of litigation warrant different judicial strategies.
During the initial stage of litigation, this theory advises judges to
utilize a restrictive approach to certifying class actions.96 Early in litigation, the defendant typically wins the majority of cases due to advan89. Id. at 1299-1300.

90. 'This jury, jury number fourteen, may disagree with twelve of the previous thirteen
juries-and hurl the industry into bankruptcy." Id. at 1300.
91. Id.

92. See id. at 1298.
93. See Mass Torts for Judges, supra note 72, at 1841.

94. Id. See also Coffee, supra note 56, at 1359.
95. Mass Torts for Judges, supra note 72, at 1841.
96. Id. at 1842.
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tages in available resources, information, law, and strategy.97 In
addition, the extensive discovery process involved in mass torts creates
difficulties for plaintiffs' attorneys attempting to locate documents and
information necessary for their case. 98 Plaintiffs may also encounter
legal obstacles in attempting to develop new legal theories. 99 During
this stage, defendants "may attempt to expedite weaker claims and delay
the stronger ones in an effort to construct a string of precedent-setting
favorable verdicts."'' 0 In this early stage of litigation, defendants may
devote more time and money defending their product than each individual claim would normally require in an effort to prevent a progression
into the second cycle. 10 '
The cycle progresses to the second stage, in which the plaintiffs
enjoy the advantage, only when the plaintiffs first succeed in obtaining
favorable jury verdicts or negotiating a major settlement.' 0 2 This success suggests that they have developed a credible strategy on liability,
10 3
causation, and damages and have surmounted existing legal obstacles.
During this stage, a popular consensus may arise in favor of the plaintiffs, thus strengthening the momentum of the shift in success.' 04 As a
result of this success, filings of new cases increase dramatically.0 5
Plaintiffs' attorneys begin to exhaust their strong claims while the
defendants' attorneys begin to develop novel and more successful strategies leading to increased success for the defendants.' 6 This success
07
leads to the final stage of the cycle.'
In In re Rhone-Poulenc, the defendants created a string of precedent-setting verdicts in their favor.108 Moreover, other defendant blood
banks throughout the country continue to enjoy similar successes. 0 9 A
great deal of the success enjoyed by blood manufacturers throughout the
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Rosenberg, supra note 77, at 710.
101. Id.; see also Mass Torts for Judges, supra note 72, at 1841-42.
102. Mass Torts for Judges, supra note 72, at 1842.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1843.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). Since the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re RhonePoulenc, the defendants' record has changed to eleven wins in eleven fully tried cases. The one
favorable verdict achieved by the plaintiffs was reversed and remanded by the Eleventh Circuit.
Christopher v. Cutter Lab., 53 F.3d 1184, reh'g denied, en banc, 65 F.3d 185 (1th Cir. 1995).
The Seventh Circuit also remanded a defense verdict. Gruca v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 51 F.3d
638 (7th Cir. 1995).
109. See Beaton v. American Assoc. of Blood Banks, No. 93 CV 0393 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1995)
(finding that the defendant blood bank was not negligent in its blood screening procedures).
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country stems from "blood shield statutes," which insulate blood manufacturers from strict liability claims.' 10 This protection emerged in Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital."'I In that case, the New York Court of
Appeals found that where the blood transfusion services of the defendant
hospital were secondary to other services provided by the hospital, the
defendant was entitled to the traditional protection against strict liability
Following Perlmutter, every
enjoyed by medical service providers.'
jurisdiction except New Jersey, Vermont, and the District of Columbia
enacted "blood shield statutes."''1 3 Some jurisdictions even included
blood manufacturers as part of the class of persons insulated by these
statutes." 4 As a result of this widespread protection, some commentators have concluded that strict liability theories are unavailable to
hemophiliacs suing blood manufacturers." 5
Blood bank manufacturers have also experienced success in
defending against negligence claims" 6 because they are generally held
to the standard of professional care,' ' 7 rather than the stricter standard of
ordinary care.118 Under the professional standard of care, the defendant
manufacturer escapes liability by proving that it conformed to the gen-9
eral practices of other blood manufacturers in the industry at the time."I
110. Kathryn W. Pieplow, Aids, Blood Banks and the Courts: The Legal Response to
Transfusion-Acquired Disease, 38 S.D. L. REV. 609, 622-23 (1993).
111. 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954), reh'g denied, 125 N.E.2d 869 (N.Y. 1955).
112. Id. at 795.
113. Pieplow, supra note 110, at 622-23.
114. See, e.g., Miles Lab., Inc. v. Doe, 556 A.2d 1107, 1121 (Md. 1989) (finding that the
compelling necessity for blood and blood products outweighs the known risk that products may
contain some impurities, and therefore, holding that strict liability principles are not applicable
against blood banks).
115. Joseph Kelly, The Liability of Blood Banks and Manufacturers of Clotting Products to
Recipients of HIV Infected Blood: A Comparison of the Law and Reaction in the United States,
Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, and Australia, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 465, 468 (1994).
116. See, e.g., Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming a
summary judgment in favor of the defendant); McKee v. Miles Lab., Inc. 675 F. Supp. 1060,
1063-64 (E.D. Ky. 1987), aff'd, McKee v. Cutter Lab., Inc. 866 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding
that although the defendant pharmaceutical company did not use alternative testing to identify the
HIV virus, it did not violate the standard of care within the profession, absent the industry's
knowledge that HIV could be transmitted through blood).
117. Pieplow, supra note 110, at 629. See also Jones v. Miles Lab., Inc., 700 F. Supp. 1127
(N.D. Ga. 1988) (finding that the defendant blood bank must conform to the standard of a
reasonably prudent blood manufacturer); Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.
1987) (holding a blood bank to the standard of care of the applicable blood banking community);
Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (employing a
professional standard of care); United Blood Serv. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509 (Colo. 1992)
(finding that the defendant blood bank must comport to the standard of professional care of the
blood banking industry); Doe v. American Red Cross, 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989) (stating
"we defer to the collective wisdom of a profession").
118. Kelly, supra note 115, at 468.
119. See id. at 472-73.
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Because the entire blood banking industry generally began testing after
many plaintiffs contracted the HIV virus, negligence actions under the
professional standard of care have generally failed.120 Both the unavailability of a strict liability cause of action and the lack of success
achieved by plaintiffs in their negligence claims may indicate that plaintiffs will never enjoy enough success to propel the hemophilia blood
controversy into the second stage of litigation.
In spite of the apparent roadblocks faced by hemophiliac plaintiffs,
they have begun to achieve limited success. For example, despite Indiana's blood shield statute, an Indiana appellate court recently upheld a
strict products liability claim against four defendant pharmaceutical
companies. 121 In JKB v. Amour Pharmaceutical Corp., the Indiana
Court of Appeals reversed a lower court's summary dismissal of a strict
liability claim, refusing to extend the blood shield's statutory protection
to blood bank companies.1 22 Although this is the first decision to
exclude pharmaceutical companies from the protection of a blood shield
law, 123 other states may follow this example.

In an effort to continue their success, hemophiliacs across the country continue to file both individual and class action suits against blood
manufacturers. 1 24 Significantly, in several recent cases plaintiffs have
emerged victorious. 125 For example, in Snyder v. American Ass'n of
120. Lotfi, supra note 9, at 184. Most victims bringing suits were probably infected during the
period extending from 1981 through the development of the test for AIDS in 1985. Id. at 184,
189.
121. JKB v. Armour Pharmaceutical Corp., 660 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
122. Id.
123. JKB v. Armour Pharmaceutical Corp., 660 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting
plaintiffs' attorney Larry Jackson). AIDS LrriG. REP., at 15926 (Aug. 9, 1996).
124. See, e.g., Jones v. Bayer Corp., No. 95-10489 CA 02 (11th Cir. 1995), AIDS Lrric. REP.,
at 13945 (July 14, 1995) (involving 500 hemophiliac plaintiffs filing a 16-count class action suit
against both blood coagulant manufacturers and the National Hemophilia Foundation); see also
Morabito v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-CV-4409 (Colo. Dist. 1995), PROD. SAFErY &
LIAB. REP., at 1133 (Oct. 27, 1995) (involving five hemophiliacs filing a class action suit against
the same five defendants involved in Rhone-Poulenc and using the same two theories of
negligence); Doe v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., AIDS LITIG. Rm,., at 13947 (July 14, 1995)
(filing the first class action suit after Rhone-Poulenc and alleging that the defendant
pharmaceutical companies failed to warn patients despite their knowledge that their blood-clotting
medications might have been contaminated).
125. For example, in Advincula v. United Blood Services, an Illinois court of appeals upheld a
$2.14 million jury verdict to the widow of a man who contracted AIDS from a tainted blood
transfusion. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 654 N.E.2d 644 (Ill. App. 1st 1995).
Unfortunately, hemophiliacs are also still experiencing setbacks. For example, in Doe v.
American Red Cross, an Arizona district court recently reversed a prior partial class certification
order in a hemophiliac class action suit charging negligence against a blood manufacturer. Doe v.
American Red Cross, No. CIV 94-521 TUC RMB (D. Ariz. 1995), AIDS Lrri. REP., at 14792-93
(Dec. 22, 1995) (reversal of certification order summarized in AIDS LITIG. REP., at 16034 (Aug.
23, 1996).
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Blood Banks, 26 the court upheld a $405,000 judgment, finding the
defendant blood manufacturer negligent in failing to implement surrogate blood testing. 27 In its decision, a New Jersey appellate court
observed the "sorry history of this nation's response to the AIDS epidemic during its first three years," and noted that "there was enough
blame to go around" to negligent manufacturers. 28 Furthermore, in
Dipaolo v. New York Blood Center,129 a New York jury awarded Joey
DiPaolo, the hemophiliac plaintiff, a $1.5 million verdict after finding
that the blood center failed to screen its blood adequately.' 3 ° Mr.
DiPaolo was so confident in his victory that six months later he asked
the court to set aside the $1.5 million jury award in order to allow him to
challenge the sufficiency of his $150,000 award for future pain and suffering.' 3' Subsequently, Mr. DiPaolo vacated his award and settled with
32
New York Blood Center for an undisclosed amount.
In sum, the emerging victories and progressions in the
hemophiliacs' claims against blood manufacturers suggest that Judge
Posner may have incorrectly assumed that the defendants' victories in
their first twelve of thirteen cases was a representative sample of their
liability. Continued success in these areas may very well propel this
mass tort into the second cycle of litigation, proving Judge Posner's
assumption incorrect.
2.

CONDITIONING CERTIFICATION ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF
SUCCESS ON THE MERITS JEOPARDIZES FAIRNESS
CONCERNS FOR PLAINTIFFS

In refusing certification, Judge Posner utilizes the flawed Representative Sample Premise to create a standard conditioning certification
upon a judge's finding that the plaintiffs' class action has a probability
of success on the merits.' 33 By delaying certification until the plaintiffs
have demonstrated their ability to succeed, this inquiry ensures certification of only mature mass torts.' 34
126. 659 A.2d 482 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), affd, 676 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 1996).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 495.
129. No. 2751/91 (NY Sup. Ct. 1996), AIDS LrM. REP., at 15927 (Mar. 22, 1996).
130. Id.
131. AIDS LING. REP., at 15927 (Aug. 9, 1996).
132. Id.
133. Coffee, supra note 56, at 1438. See also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293
(7th Cir. 1995).
134. Such a standard would probably prevent "strike suits." A strike suit usually emerges in the
context of a derivative action where the nuisance value of the suit creates settlement value,
regardless of the merits of the suit. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM L. Rv. 669 (1986).
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As discussed earlier in Section IA, however, plaintiffs are incredi35
bly disadvantaged during the early stages of the maturation process.
"[O]ne obvious and inescapable fact about mass tort litigation must be
placed at center stage in any public policy analysis: mass tort litigation
typically involves seriously injured persons who lack insurance or substantial financial resources." 136 Certification of class action suits helps
plaintiffs with costly and uncertain cases obtain access to the legal system. Instead of refusing to represent these claimants, attorneys will welcome their addition to a large class.137 Class actions are often necessary
to protect the interests of individual plaintiffs due to the heavy burdens
of individual adjudications. 38 In the Proposed Amendments to Rule 23,
the writers recognized this necessity by including as a pertinent factor
for considering certification: "the practical ability of individual
class
' 39
members to pursue their claims without class certification."'
Under the proposed standard, courts should consider that individual
trials create inefficiency by requiring numerous plaintiffs to duplicate
identical or substantially similar cases despite resolution in previous trials.14 0 In contrast, defendants involved in duplicative trials may utilize
their resources and defenses in different trials.Y'4 As previously recognized by the Seventh Circuit, these results violate the purpose of Rule
23, which is to prevent defendants from enjoying considerable advantages by continually contesting
liability in individual suits stemming
42
from identical conduct.
As a result of these defense tactics, attorneys unfamiliar with the
cyclical theory of litigation may refuse to take legitimate cases due to
their perception that hemophiliacs simply do not have a case against
blood manufacturers. After the Seventh Circuit's decision in RhonePoulenc, and the current success of the nationwide defendant manufacturers, 43 attorneys could easily form such an opinion. Thus, claims
against blood manufacturers may cease thereby precluding further success by the hemophiliac community. This eliminates the possibility that
the litigation cycle of this tort will progress into the second stage of
litigation. Because nationwide implementation of a standard requiring a
showing of a probability of success on the merits could wholly deny
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See infra Section IA.
Coffee, supra note 56, at 1355.
See id.
See In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 466 (D. Wyo. 1995).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A), Proposed Amendment.
Rosenberg, supra note 77, at 710.
Id.
See Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th Cir. 1941).
See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
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redress to plaintiffs with strong causes of action, the standard subverts
the fairness goals of substantive tort law.
This standard also impedes both the fairness and efficiency goals of
civil procedure by reducing the value of class action certification as a
settlement fostering device.'" Requiring plaintiffs to prove a
probability of success on the merits of their claims will delay certification of any kind until plaintiffs can establish enough success to allow the
maturation cycle of this tort to mature. 45 As a result, both plaintiffs and
defendants will be forced to litigate individual suits until the tort
matures, placing unnecessary burdens on the court system.
Recent cases support the proposition that the class action can and
should be used as a device for fostering settlement. For example, in
A.H. Robins,146 after citing several opinions and academic comments
that approvingly discussed certification of a class action for settlement
purposes, 147 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed consideration of the class action as a settlement fostering device. 48 Settlement
through class certification may promote the fair resolution of a controversy by eliminating punitive damages and placing a limit on a defend149
ant's liability without denying plaintiffs access to the court.
Certification for settlement purposes advances the goals of Rule 23 by
promoting a fair and efficient resolution of the controversy. 50
Seriously undermining plaintiffs' negotiation power, Judge Posner
needlessly subverts these Rule 23 goals. By denying certification on the
likelihood of the defendants' success, Judge Posner's decision placed the
defendants in a considerably stronger position. In Rhone-Poulenc, the
plaintiff class was left with the choice of filing numerous individual
144. In fact, in decertifying the class, Judge Posner hoped to decrease certification as a
settlement fostering device. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.
145. Coffee, supra note 56, at 1355.
146. In re A.H. Robins, Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 736 (4th Cir. 1988).
147. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1009 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 723 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Nielson, supra note 68, at 480. See also
supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
148. A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 739. Recently, the Third Circuit upheld this principle in
certifying a settlement class. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 88 (1995).
149. Symposium, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CoRNELL L.
REv. 858, 900 (1995).
150. In the proposed amendments to Rule 23(b)(4), the writers encourage the use of the class
action as a settlement fostering device by allowing certification even though "the requirements of
subdivision (b)(3) might not be met." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(4), Proposed Amendments. But note,
in some cases, certification for settlement purposes may allow an unfair resolution of the
controversy. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1993), aff'd, 138
L. Ed. 2d 689 (1997) (protecting individuals who failed to timely opt-out of a class settlement
reached on the same day as the case was filed, by finding that the proposed class did not satisfy
the requirements of adequacy, representation, and typicality of claims).
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suits, as Judge Posner predicted they would, or settling with the defendants. However, due to Judge Posner's finding that the defendants would
prevail in a significant majority of its individual suits, a settlement at
this time would be for considerably less than a settlement reached at the
time of commencement.
Contrary to Judge Posner's hypothesis that individual plaintiffs'
successes would produce judgments in the millions and encourage individual suits, 1 51 the plaintiff class in Rhone-Poulenc settled. Judge Grady
approved a $640 million settlement in a combined settlement proposal
for the Rhone-Poulenc class and the class involved in the litigation for In
re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation.5 2 This
was a significantly lower amount than the potential 25 billion dollar
53
recovery predicted by Judge Posner.1
As Section I shows, the historical cycle of Rule 23 lacks justification for a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the plaintiffs' case as a
condition for class certification. Instead, throughout the historical
evolution of the class action as a dispute resolution device, courts routinely focused on the individual fairness concerns to plaintiffs, and later
on the judicial efficiency considerations created by crowded court dockets.1 54 In proposing such an inquiry, Judge Posner is engrafting changes
to Rule 23 that are outside the language and history of Rule 23. These
changes to Rule 23, if allowed to survive, will transform the class action
from "a sword for plaintiffs" to "a shield for defendants,"15 5 thus,
enabling defendants to settle for considerably lower amounts than the
plaintiffs might eventually receive when the tort matures.
3.

EXISTING CASE LAW POSES SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO CONDITIONING

CLASS CERTIFICATION ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
ON THE MERITS

In addition to the policy considerations that the Representative
Sample Premise subverts, the Supreme Court decision, Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin,156 expressly prohibits the use of such a standard. In Eisen,
the Court considered whether a judge may conduct a preliminary inquiry
151. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1300. However, this probably still precludes plaintiffs with

both limited resources and marginal cases from bringing suits against the defendants' blood
banks. See, e.g., In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 466 (D. Wyo. 1995)

(recognizing that without class certification, many clients with small claims will be precluded
from bringing claims against large defendants).
152. In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Products Litigation, No. 986 (J.P.M.L) No. 93C-7452 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 1996), AIDS LrrG. REP., at 16547 (Dec. 13, 1996).
153. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1298.

154. See supra Section I.
155. Coffee, supra note 56, at 1350.

156. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
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into the merits of a case in deciding class certification. 157 The Court
found nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 granting the
authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in
Rule 23 determinations.15 1 Instead, the Court found that such a procedure contravenes Rule 23 by allowing a representative plaintiff to secure
59
the benefits of a class action without first satisfying its requirements.1
Proponents of the Rhone-Poulenc standard, conditioning certification on the likelihood of the success on the merits, would likely distinguish the facts in Eisen from the facts in Rhone-Poulenc. In Eisen, the
Supreme Court based its decision on the protection of the defendant's
rights."6 In dismissing the class action, the Court noted that a preliminary determination of the merits could cause a substantial amount of
prejudice to the defendant by indicating the defendant's guilt without a
full and fair determination.' 61 This places an unfair burden on the
defendant without providing adequate safeguards for the defendant's
protection.' 62 Contrary to the Eisen case, in Rhone-Poulenc, Judge Posner did not substitute a preliminary inquiry for the requirements of Rule
63
23, but used the inquiry as an additional condition for certification.
Therefore, Judge Posner's standard provides more, not less, protection
for defendants.' 64
Any attempt to distinguish the two cases fails. In effect, Judge Posner's standard produces the same result as that produced in Eisen.
Although the plaintiffs met the conditions of Rule 23, Judge Posner substituted a preliminary inquiry for the requirements of Rule 23 to decertify the class.' 65 However, in substituting such an inquiry for the
requirements of Rule 23, Judge Posner fails to cite support for this
act. 166

In summary, Judge Posner uses the flawed Representative Sample
Premise, that the hemophiliac class is not likely to succeed on the merits
of their case, to conclude that defendants would suffer irreparable harm
as a result of certification and to find that individual trials are the supe157. Id. at 177.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 178.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296-98.
164. See Coffee, supra note 56, at 1438.
165. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296-98.
166. See In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 460 (D. Wyo. 1995) (noting the
lack of legal support for Judge Posner's standard, refusing to grant a writ of mandamus to
decertify a national pharmaceutical class action, and noting that although "[s]uch economic
reasoning may carry substantial weight in the Seventh Circuit, but this Court must look to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23 and its interpretation by courts to determine the appropriateness of class certification").
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rior method for the resolution of the case. This standard is both substantively and procedurally unfair to these plaintiffs. Not only does this
standard considerably decrease the plaintiffs' access to courts by requiring all plaintiffs to sue individually, it diminishes the possibility of a
classwide settlement. Finally, Judge Posner lacks the legal authority to
condition certification on a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the
case. Therefore, Judge Posner incorrectly found that Judge Grady
abused his discretion in certifying a class action instead of utilizing individual trials.
IV.

THE DIFFERENT NEGLIGENCE STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES
PRECLUDE A NATIONWIDE DETERMINATION

OF NEGLIGENCE

The second factor relied upon by Judge Posner in finding that
Judge Grady abused his discretion pertains to Judge Grady's certification for a classwide determination of negligence.1 67 Although the fiftyone jurisdictions in the United States may employ either the standard of
ordinary care or the standard of professional care in a determination of
negligence, Judge Grady found that the issue could be tried on a nationwide basis.' 68 The parties could easily offer evidence regarding both the
169
standard of ordinary care and the standard of professional care.
Judge Posner, in contrast, found that a nationwide determination of
negligence would violate the rule formulated in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins. 170 In Erie, the Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting
in diversity lacked the authority to apply a general common law rather
than the common law of the state.' 7 1 After Erie, a federal court may
only provide an alternative forum for the litigation of state law claims, it
may not provide an additional and different forum. 172 Employing this
rationale, Judge Posner found that because the state common law negligence doctrines differ, even if only as to slight nuances, defendants' liability could differ from state to state. 173 For example, some states
employ a professional standard of care fixed by the blood bank profession. In order to prevail under this standard, plaintiffs must prove that
defendants acted inconsistent with those precautions utilized by other
blood banking industries. 74 In contrast, other states employ the stan167. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 422-25 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
168. Id.

169. Id.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id.
Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1302.
Id. at 1301-02.
Kelly, supra note 115, at 472-73. See also Theodore Silver, On A Hundred Years of
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dard of ordinary care which requires the defendant to have acted as a
reasonable blood processor would have acted under similar circumstances. 175 These differing standards led Judge Posner to conclude that a
class determination of the issue of negligence would violate the rule of
Erie.176 In order to make one nationwide determination, Judge Posner
argued that a district court would have to create its own standard of care
177
instead of employing the state standards of care as required by Erie.
The validity of a classwide determination of negligence turns on the
Erie question. If Judge Grady's trial plan creates federal substantive
law, as argued by Judge Posner, then the plan violates Erie. But, if the
plan merely provides access to an alternate forum, as argued by Judge
Grady, the Erie doctrine permits a nationwide determination of
negligence.
In Wadleigh, Judge Grady found that the substantially identical definitions of standards in ordinary care jurisdictions allow a Restatement
based jury instruction to prevent differences in state law from dominating the common issues. 178 Under the Restatement standard of care, to
avoid negligence, an actor must conform to the standard of conduct "of a
reasonable man under like circumstances."'179 Judge Grady found this
the best method, noting that the different standards of care employed by
differing jurisdictions would not impact the factual questions at issue.' s0
Although the different jurisdictional definitions of ordinary care
significantly mirror each other, judicial interpretations of these definitions differ substantially. For example, some courts instruct a jury that if
Harmful Error: The HistoricalJurisprudenceof Medical Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1193,
1213 (1992) (recognizing that in a state with the professional standard of care, a defendant may
lawfully adopt and follow practices that are negligent and unreasonable under the standard of
ordinary care).
175. Lotfi, supra note 9, at 198.
176. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1302.
177. Id. As recognized by Judge Posner, Congress may constitutionally mandate a uniform
standard of liability for blood manufacturers.
178. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 419-20.
179. This is so unless the actor is a child. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS § 283 (1977).
The Wadleigh court found this definition substantially identical to the standard of care in Illinois.
The Illinois standard of care is defined as "the failure to do something which a reasonably careful
person would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not do,
under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence." IPI, Civil, § 10.01. See also Vuono
v. New York Blood Ctr., Inc., 696 F. Supp. 743, 746 (D. Mass. 1988) (requiring the defendant
fractionators to exercise that degree of care that a reasonable and prudent blood bank would or
should have exercised under the same or similar circumstances); Hernandez v. Nueces County
Medical Soc'y Community Blood Bank, 779 S.W.2d 867 (Tex App. 1989) (refusing to find
evidence of the defendants' compliance with industry custom as conclusive on the issue of
negligence; instead requiring a showing that the defendant acted consistent with that of other
health care providers acting with ordinary care, skill, and diligence under the same or similar
circumstances).
180. Wadleigh, 157 F.R.D. at 419-20.
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the defendant proves that he acted as another reasonable person in like
circumstances would have acted the jury should find that the defendant
acted with due care. 18' Other courts instruct the jury on what the
defendant ought to have done, stating that what the defendant actually
did, reasonable or not, is irrelevant. 82 Under the former inquiry, a jury
decides the question of ordinary care by "finding out what people have
done" and determining whether the defendant acted in accordance. 83 In
the latter inquiry, a jury decides what should be expected of the defendant class and labels that as reasonable. 184 A district judge formulating a
jury instruction for a nationwide determination of negligence must
choose between one of these views of the reasonable person. Consequently, this jury instruction would create substantive law, thereby violating Erie.

Likewise, jurisdictional variations of the professional standard of
care differ to such an extent that differing standards of care emerge. At
least two different types of professional standards of care exist. First,
some jurisdictions employ a locality test in which doctors and others in
the medical field are held to the standard of care of a professional in the
same locality.1 85 In a jurisdiction employing this test, juries compare the
defendants conduct to the conduct of any local blood banks or to blood
banks situated in localities similar to the jurisdiction in which the trial
1 86
takes place.
A second type of standard of professional care requires a blood
bank to exercise the degree of care exercised by the blood banking
industry in similar circumstances.1 87 Under this standard, courts generally require proof that the defendant "failed to conform to the generally
recognized and accepted practices in his profession." 88 Additionally,
the effect of a finding that the defendants did or did not conform to the
standard of care differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One variation
181. Lotfi, supra note 9, at 198.
182. Id. at 196.
183. Clarence Morris, Note, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1147-48 (1942).
184. See id.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977). The "community" or "locality" rule was
established in Massachusetts as early as 1880 in Small v. Howard. The court held that a town
practitioner is not bound to possess the high degree of skill of a city practitioner, but is merely
bound to possess the skill ordinarily possessed by physicians and surgeons of ordinary ability and
skill practicing in similar localities and lacking the opportunity for larger experience. 128 Mass.
131 (1880).
186. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Serv., 377 S.E.2d 323 (S.C. 1989).
187. Pieplow, supra note 110, at 637-38. See also Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Mass.
1968) (overruling the "locality" standard and measuring the professional standard of care by the
average competent practitioner in the same or similar circumstances, taking into account advances
in the profession).
188. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Serv., 377 S.E.2d at 326.
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treats such evidence as an irrebuttable presumption of due care.18 9 For
example, in Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services,t90 the Supreme
Court of South Carolina placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove that
the defendant failed to conform to the generally recognized and accepted
practices of his profession, and noted that a failure to meet this burden
would result in a finding that the defendant did not breach the standard
19 1
of care as a matter of law.

An additional jurisdictional variation of the professional standard of
care treats evidence of the defendant's conformity with industry practice
as a rebuttable presumption.' 92 In United Blood Services v. Quintana,
the Supreme Court of Colorado recognized the professional standard of
care, but held that a finding that the defendant blood bank conformed to
that standard was not conclusive proof of due care, instead creating a
rebuttable presumption of due care.' 93 The court cited Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in T.J. Hooper'94 to avoid allowing a profession to set a
measure of its own legal liability below a level of care easily obtained
through practical procedures. 195 The court concluded, therefore, that in
a professional negligence case, the trial court should permit the plaintiff
to present evidence that the standard practices adopted by the industry
and employed by the defendant were "unreasonably deficient by not
incorporating readily available practices and procedures substantially
more protective against the harm caused to the plaintiff than the standard
of care adopted by the defendant's school of practice."' 96 In such a
jurisdiction, upon the presentation of competent evidence that the standard of care employed by the defendant was unreasonable, the issue of
whether the defendants employed due care becomes a question for the
97
jury.1
A third variation of the general nationwide professional negligence
189. Pieplow, supra note 110, at 635.
190. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Serv., 377 S.E.2d at 326.
191. Id. at 326.
192. Pieplow, supra note 110, at 636.
193. United Blood Serv. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 521 (Colo. 1992).
194. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662, (1932) (finding
that the reasonable prudence of an industry cannot act as the only measure of negligence because
"a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices," and
therefore courts must "in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that
even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission." See also Helling v. Carey, 519
P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that sometimes courts must overrule the standard of care
employed by a whole profession where, as here, a simple and inexpensive glaucoma test would
prevent irreversible eye damage, and therefore, the utility of employing the test outweighs any
costs associated with its use).
195. Quintana, 827 P.2d at 520.
196. Id. at 521.
197. See id.
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standard utilizes professional customs as relevant to, but not conclusive
on, the issue of breach. 98 In Smith v. Paslode Corp., the Eastern District of Missouri defined the professional standard of care as the "care
commonly exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful and prudent blood
bank in its procurement, processing, distribution and use of blood products under the same or similar conditions."19 9 However, the court noted
that a finding that a particular defendant failed to comport with the professional standard of care is insufficient to support a finding of negligence. 200 Under Missouri law, the standard of care of a single
professional may be higher or lower than the standard of the profession
collectively. 01 Consequently, a jury must examine the defendant's conduct in accordance with the facts existing and actually known by the
professional at the time in question.20 2
Different juries instructed under the various standards of care will
make significantly divergent factual determinations from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. A jury sitting in a "locality" jurisdiction will compare the
defendant blood bank's conduct to the conduct of a blood bank from a
similar locality-one facing similar obstacles to advancement in the profession-to decide whether the defendant acted in accordance with such
companies.
Under the nationwide professional standard of care employed in
South Carolina, a jury must consider whether the defendant acted in
accordance with the recognized and accepted practice of his profession.
This requires the jury to make a finding of fact as to the defendant's
conduct relative to the nationwide professional practice. Because this
factual finding is conclusive, the jury's inquiry ends there.
In Colorado, however, in addition to making similar findings of
facts in regard to the defendant's conduct in relation to the professional
practice, the jury must also determine whether the defendant's adherence
to the professional practice was reasonable in light of the harm caused to
the plaintiff. This inquiry entails a comparison of the plaintiff's injuries
with the professional standard of conduct, creating an extra step for the
jury process. Such an inquiry requires the presentation of evidence and
expert testimony as to the unreasonableness of the defendant's actions,
creating the possibility of jury confusion.203 A consolidated trial might
198. Pieplow, supra note 110, at 636.
199. Smith v. Paslode Corp, 799 F. Supp. 960, 969 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
200. Id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 969. This suggests that Missouri does not consider what the professional should
have known, but only what the professional actually did know.
203. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, joinder requires litigants to avoid confusing the issues and
misleading the jury.
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overcome such jury confusion by separating out the jurisdiction in which
this extra inquiry was required and applying the first finding to some
jurisdictions, and both findings to other jurisdictions. Even if a jury
could accomplish that task, the Missouri standard still poses a significant
obstacle to consolidation.
Under the Missouri standard, it appears impossible to determine
negligence on a class basis. The language employed by the court in
Paslode suggests that such a determination must occur on a case by case
basis because facts peculiar to the particular professional might give rise
to an even lower standard than that of the collective profession.2 "4 As
discussed earlier, the Paslode decision suggests that an individual blood
bank's liability could turn on the particular knowledge that it possessed,
rather than on the knowledge it as a company should have possessed.2 "5
In this case, this would entail at least five individual findings of the
particular facts existing and known by the five individual defendants at
the time in question.
Due to the significant differences in the standard of professional
care in the different jurisdictions in the United States, Judge Grady's
proposal that a standard set of forms could be drafted creating a uniform
standard of professional care would violate Erie. The number of different standards of professional care make it extremely difficult to incorporate the numerous standards into one trial. Moreover, even if it were
possible to instruct the jury as to each different standard, individual
questions of fact and the law peculiar to different jurisdictions will dominate. 2" This requires the negligence issue to be unmanageable on a
class basis and not be the "superior" method for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.20 7
This conclusion, however, does not preclude the alternative of partial class certification. As illustrated earlier, individual trials are not a
superior alternative to a class resolution.208 Consequently, certification
of partial statewide classes for resolution of the liability issue is the best
available option. This solution retains the advantages of achieving substantive fairness and judicial efficiency while avoiding the Erie violations encountered by Judge Grady's plan.

204. See Paslode, 799 F. Supp. at 969.
205. See id.
206. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) requires that "the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."
207. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) also requires that the "class action [be] superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."
208. See supra Section II.
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V.

JUDGE GRADY'S TRIAL PLAN IN WADLEIGH IS IN ACCORD

WITH SEVENTH AMENDMENT REQUIREMENTS

Judge Posner bases his final argument for decertification on the theory that a bifurcated trial violates the Seventh Amendment proscription
that the findings of one jury cannot be reexamined by a subsequent

jury.209 According to Posner, Judge Grady's plan, which granted partial

certification under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) for the determination of negligence
on a classwide basis, creates a Seventh Amendment violation by failing
to allow the class action jury to make a final determination of liability. 110 Under this plan, after the jury in the class action made its initial
determination of negligence, subsequent juries in individual trials will
determine the issues of comparative negligence and proximate cause.21'
Although Judge Posner recognized that bifurcated trials are authorized
by Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,21 2 he argued that
comparative negligence and proximate cause overlap the original determination of negligence or liability, thereby allowing the subsequent

juries to review the original findings of the class jury. 1 3 In order to
determine comparative negligence, a subsequent jury will compare the
defendant's negligence to that of the plaintiff.21 4 In order to determine

proximate cause, the subsequent jury will determine if the injuries suffered by the plaintiff were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.21 5
To determine either of these issues, Posner argued that the subsequent
jury must review the earlier findings of the class jury, leading him to
hypothesize that the two juries could come to inconsistent conclusions.
A second or subsequent jury might find that the defendants' failure to
take precautions against infection with Hepatitis B could not be
thought the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' infection with HIV, a
incondifferent and unknown blood-borne virus. How the resulting
2 16
us.
escapes
prevented
be
could
juries
the
between
sistency

In his discussion of the Seventh Amendment, Judge Posner misinterprets the element of proximate cause. In determining proximate
cause, the jury decides whether the risk of harm to plaintiffs was within
the scope of the risk that was foreseeable to defendants.21 7 In contrast,
209. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303.
210. Id.
211. Id.

212. Id. at 1302.
213. Id.

214. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
1226 (Cal. 1975); WILLIAM L. PROSSER Er AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 575 (8th ed.
1991).

215. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
216. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995).
217. Id.
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in determining liability the jury decides whether the actions taken by the
defendant were unreasonable as defined by the particular jurisdiction. 18
Under Judge Grady's plan, the class jury will decide whether the defendant acted as it should have or in accordance with the practice of the
blood manufacturing industry, while subsequent juries will decide
whether, given the unreasonableness, the particular risk of harm suffered
by the plaintiffs was foreseeable. The former inquiry focuses on the
conduct of the defendants or others similarly situated, while the latter
inquiry focuses on the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Consequently, as
Posner realizes, a subsequent jury may consider whether the defendants'
failure to take precautions against infection with Hepatitis B created a
reasonably foreseeable risk of contracting the HIV virus.2 19 This
inquiry, therefore, turns on the jury's definition of the scope of the risk.
If the jury defines the risk of harm, which defendants should have exercised due care to prevent, as all viral infections from blood, then they
will probably find that defendants' failure to use due care to avoid this
risk was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. However, if the jury
defines the risk of harm, which defendants should have exercised due
care to prevent, as the risk of HIV infection, then it probably will find
that defendants' conduct was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries, regardless of whether defendant exercised due care. Such an
inquiry is completely separate from the issue of whether the defendant
was negligent in failing to take precautions against viral infection, and
leaves the Seventh Amendment unharmed. In determining proximate
cause after the class jury determines negligence, subsequent individual
juries would not reexamine the previous findings of the class jury.
Likewise, the inquiry necessary for ajury to determine comparative
negligence remains distinct from the inquiry necessary for the class jury
to determine negligence. If the class jury finds that the defendant acted
unreasonably, subsequent individual juries must then decide if the plaintiff also acted unreasonably or without due care. If so, given the prior
determination of the defendant's unreasonable conduct, the jury then
decides who acted more unreasonably. 220 This inquiry picks up where
the class jury left off, avoiding Seventh Amendment violations.
In arguing that Judge Grady's plan violates the Seventh Amendment, Judge Posner fails to address conflicting case law supporting the
constitutionality of bifurcated trials. For example, In Re Benedictin Liti218. As discussed supra, Part III, although different jurisdictions define "unreasonable"
differently, juries determining negligence will still decide if defendants breached the standard of
unreasonableness as defined by that jurisdiction.
219. Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303.
220. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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gation22 1 upheld a trifurcated trial plan. In that case, the plaintiffs
objected to trifurcation of their trial on the grounds that by trying only
the issue of proximate causation, trifurcation violated their Seventh
Amendment right to trial by jury.22 2 However, the Sixth Circuit held

that the issue of causation could be separated from the issue of defendant's liability without violating the Seventh Amendment. 223 In its consideration of the issue, the court noted that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, specifically Rule 42(b), contemplated the possibility of bifurcating a negligence case.2"
Although the Sixth Circuit recognized that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure authorize the use of bifurcated trials, in Rhone-Poulenc
Judge Posner failed to address this conflicting authority. For example,
the comments to Rule 23(c)(4)(A) state that "an action may be brought
or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues. 225
Numerous courts have utilized this provision to partially certify a class
action as a major dispute resolution device, without concern for Seventh
Amendment violations.226 In effect, Judge Posner's analysis of Rule 23
eviscerates subsection (c)(4)(A), and unnecessarily eliminates a highly
effective instrument for managing mass torts without providing legal
justification for undermining the federal rules in this way.
In conclusion, Rule 42(b) and Rule 23(c)(4)(A) specifically authorize bifurcated trials. Moreover, the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and ninth
circuits have all used class certification to determine common issues of
liability-none finding any constitutional infirmities whatsoever with
this approach. 227 Thus, the overwhelming weight of current legislative
and case law demonstrates that a separate determination of liability from
the issues of proximate cause and comparative negligence does not violate the Seventh Amendment.
VI.

CONCLUSION

A nationwide implementation of Judge Posner's new standard
requiring plaintiffs to show a likelihood of success on the merits seri221. In re Benedictin, 102 F.R.D. 239, 305 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
222. Id. at 306.
223. Id. at 307 (citing 9 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT
irE AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 2388, at 280 (1971 & Supp. 1987)).
224. In re Benedictin, 102 F.R.D. 239, 307 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
225. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
226. In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 460-61 (S.D. Wyo. 1995).
227. See, e.g., id., citing In re School Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); In re A.H.
Robins Comp., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 734 (4th Cir. 1988); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d
468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Arthur
Young & Co. v. United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).

1274

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1247

ously jeopardizes plaintiffs' rights, and compromises both substantive
tort and civil procedure goals of fairness and efficiency. While Judge
Grady's trial plan should have been modified to avoid Erie violations, it
should not have been discarded. After the elimination of the Erie violations, Judge Grady's certification of the class action is both valid and the
superior method for a resolution of the controversy. Judge Posner
should not have decertified the class. Likewise, other circuits should not
follow the Seventh Circuit's lead and allow the nation to enter into a
fourth stage in the evolution of the class action suit. Instead, these circuits should continue to provide plaintiffs with a means of redress for
their injuries by granting certification orders in nationwide mass tort
actions.
LAURIE C. UUSTAL

